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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the time it was decided, the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion in Boumediene v. Bush was considered an instant classic. At 
long last, the Court's repeated engagement with Guantanamo could end. 
This sense of relief was reinforced by the election of Barack Obama to 
the presidency in November 2008. The promise of that moment appears 
to have been lost. Boumediene has yet to fulfill the expansive confines 
staked out by its holding and instead has been held hostage by its 
ambiguities and the reluctance of elected officials to resolve the still 
simmering debate over detention policy. This symposium piece provides 
a brief statement asserting that the core holdings of Boumediene should 
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be viewed through the lens of the robust judicial power that animated its 
outcome. 
II. THE LONG WIND-UP TO BOUMEDIENE 
By now, the chronology is well known. Following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States initiated a military 
campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Anticipating 
that scores of high-level Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives would be 
captured, the United States elected to create a detention center at the U.S. 
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where such individuals could be 
interrogated beyond prying eyes (and the reach of U.S. courts). The first 
detainees were brought to Guantanamo in January 2002.' They were not 
charged with crimes. Rather, they were to be held indefinitely and 
without any process as "enemy combatants."2 
In February 2002, the first habeas corpus petition on behalf of 
Guantanamo detainees was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia. The petitioners challenged the legality of their detention,' 
in the process raising fundamental constitutional and statutory questions 
regarding the availability of the writ itself, and implicating important 
issues of executive power and national security. The government moved 
to dismiss this petition and another filed shortly thereafter, arguing that 
U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over claims brought by enemy aliens held 
outside the United States.4 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled on these issues in Rasul v. 
Bush, holding that U.S. district courts had jurisdiction to hear the 
detainees' habeas cases under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.5 In a companion case, Hamm v. Rumsfeld, the Court 
ruled that a U.S. citizen could be detained as an enemy combatant 
I. Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/ 
guantanamo/timeline/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (outlining major events related to the decision to 
hold prisoners at the military base, including the arrival of the first 20 detainees). 
2. See Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., for 
the Membe� of the Am. Soc 'y oflnt'l Law-Council on Foreign Relations Roundtable (Dec. 12, 
2002), available at http://www. cfr.�r8'.'publication/5312/enemy_combatants.html (laying out the 
legal and factual framework estabhshmg the government designation of "enemy combatant" to 
detainees). 
3. G111JIJtanamo Bay Time line, supra note 1. In truth, the detainees in whose names the 
petition was brought were being held incommunicado at Guantanamo and did not even know that 
this petition, authorized by �eir 
,
family members, had been made. See Jerry Seper, High Court .:a Hear Guantan�o Det:unees .case, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A2. (noting that detainees had not been permitted to talk with counsel and were unaware of the lawsuits"). 
4. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (D.D.C. 2002). 
5. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). 
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pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)6 that 
Congress had passed shortly after September 11, 2001 and which 
authorized the President to use all "necessary and appropriate force" to 
prevent those who planned or aided the attacks of September 11 from 
attacking the United States again. 1 However, the Court made clear that a 
U.S. citizen in such circumstances was entitled to due process and 
described, in general terms, the required elements of that process.8 
These decisions marked the opening volley of a battle between the 
Supreme Court and Congress over executive detention authority. In 
response to Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(DTA).9 The DTA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees, while simultaneously creating a 
highly circwnscribed procedure by which detainees could seek review of 
their detention in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.10 Thereafter, the government argued that the DTA was 
of retroactive effect-even though the statute 's plain terms suggested 
otherwise-and that all pending Guantanamo habeas cases should be 
dismissed. 11 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a case largely concerned with 
military trials at Guantanamo, the Supreme Court held that the DTA did 
not apply retroactively.12 Congress, in turn, passed the Military 
Commissions Act of2006 (MCA), which again stripped federal courts of 
habeas jurisdiction, but this time in explicitly retroactive terms.11 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BOUMEDIENE 
The MCA set the stage for the Court's decision in Boumedlene v. 
Bush, which required it to decide whether Guantanamo detainees had a 
"constitutional privilege of habeas corpus" such that the MCA's habeas­
strip was unconstitutional pursuant to the Suspension Clause.14 To 
answer that question, the Court embarked on a thorough analysis of both 
the history of the writ itself, including English common law, and its own 
precedent concerning the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. 
6 .  
7 .  
8. 
9. 
JO. 
11. 
12 . 
13. 
(2006)). 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107 -40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
Id at 533-35. 
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005). 
Id§ 1005(e). 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 , 57 4-75 (2006). 
Id at 583-84. 
Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(eXl) 
14. 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008); U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2 ('The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not b e  suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public 
Safety may require it."). 
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The Court found that "a common thread" holding together its precedent 
was "the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors 
and practical concerns, not formalism."15 According to the Co�, such 
factors included: "( 1) the citizenship and the status of the detainee and 
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination �as 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention 
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resol ving the 
prisoner's entitlement to the writ."16 
A fter examining these factors in the context of Guantanamo, the 
Court concluded that the detainees were entitled to seek the writ and to 
invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause despite their status as 
enemy combatants and their location. 11 As such, if Congress were to 
suspend habeas, it would have to "act in accordance with the 
requirements of the Suspension Clause,"18 meaning that an adequate and 
effective substitute for habeas review would have to be provided.19 After 
analyzing the Court of Appeals' review process provided for in the 
DTA,20 the Court found it not to pass constitutional muster.21 As such, the 
Court held that the MCA's habeas-stripping provisions were 
unconstitutional and ineffective. 
IV. LIFE AFTER BOUMEDIENE 
A. Guantanamo Litigation 
Because Boumediene was decided on narrow procedural grounds, 
lower courts have been tasked with defining the contours of the merits 
hearings on th� Guantanamo detainees' habeas petitions, including the 
standard by which the legality of detentions is to be assessed, burdens of 
proof, and remedies if the writ is issued. The conclusions reached by 
?istrict. court judges on these issues have diverged at times although 
there 
ts relative agreement on a number of broad themes. 
15. 553 U.S. at 764. 
16. Id at 766. 
17. Id at 771. 
18. Id (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 564 (2004) (Sc Ji J ct· t. )) 19. See id • a a, ., 1ssen mg . 
20. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 Pub. L No 109-148 § 1005( )(2)(A) 119 Stat 2680, 2742 (2005). 
' · · 
• 
e , · 
21. See Boumediene. 553 U S  at 774 79 786 92 · · . ' · · . - , - ( contrastmg procedures in sectJ.on 1005(e) of the OTA with procedures provided for in the c d I h b d · · · s · 1e era a eas corpus statute an m statutes at issue m warn v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) and Uni'ted Stat H 342 us 205 (1952)). • es v. ayman, . .  
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For example, courts have not always agreed on the scope of the 
detention standard to be applied in individual cases,22 but they have 
reached a general consensus that the Executive has the authority to detain 
any individuals who were proven to be "part of" the Taliban or al-Qaeda. 
One oft-quoted test for determining whether a detainee was "part of" one 
of these organizations is whether "the individual functions or participates 
within or under the command structure of the organization-i.e., whether 
he receives and executes orders or directions."23 Regardless of the 
standard employed by the lower courts, there is agreement that the 
government has to make the requisite showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 24 
T he issue of remedy has arisen with some frequency given that, as 
of October 20 I 0, courts had issued the writ to thirty-eight of fifty-seven 
detainees whose cases had been heard (a percentage that lends credibility 
to those who have argued that Guantanamo contains many people who 
had no business being detained). 25 In Boumediene, the Court stated that 
"the habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of 
an individual unlawfully detained-though release need not be the 
exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which 
the writ is granted."26 Nonetheless, the question has arisen whether 
courts have the power to order release upon granting a writ, given that 
U.S. courts cannot order a foreign country to open its doors to a 
vindicated petitioner. For that reason, many of the courts granting habeas 
petitions have not ordered release outright, but rather have directed the 
government to "take all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to 
facilitate ... release."21 
The D. C. Circuit waded into these issues, which implicate thorny 
questions regarding separation of powers, and the proper roles of the 
Executive and the judiciary in national security matters. In Kiyemba v. 
Obama ( Kiyemba I), seventeen Chinese citizens, whom the government 
had already determined were not enemy combatants, moved for an order 
that would compel their release into the United States, given that they 
22. Compare cases favoring "substantially support" and those that did not adopt that 
standard. Compare Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75-77 (D.D.C. 2009), with Gherebi v. 
Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009). 
23. See, e.g., Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2 d  at 75; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71. 
24. See, e.g., El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. 
Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2009). 
25. Court Orders Rethink on Tortured Guantanamo Pn'soner:S Successfi.Jl Habeas Petition, 
ANDY WORTHINGTON, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.andyworthington.eo.uk/2010/11/09/court­
orders-rethink-on-torutred-guantanamo-prisoners-successful-habeas-petition/. 
26. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. 
27. See, e.g., El Gharani, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 149; Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 130. 
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feared torture or execution if they were returned to China."x At the 
fer vent urging of the Government, the D.C. Circuit reversed a ?istrict 
court order directing that the petitioners be brought to the court. - ' The 
D.C. Circuit held that there was no authorization in any law that would 
allow the "district court to set aside the decision of the Executive Branch 
and to order the[] aliens brought to the United States and released in 
u. i hin D C ,,10 vvas gton, . . . 
The court gave a brief history of the e xclusive right of the Executive 
to make determinations on whom to admit and not admit within its 
borders. It looked to precedent for its analytical framework that no court 
can "review the determination of the political branch of the Government 
to exclude a given alien" without express authorization by law.11 Turning 
to possible avenues of such express authorization-including due 
process, the maxim ubijus, ibi remeduium (where there is a right there is 
a remedy), the fact that the district court had jurisdiction over the habeas 
petition, and a basic fairness argument-the court ultimately determined 
that none of these bases was sufficient to allow the district court to 
override the political branch's determination regarding these aliens.12 
Similar issues were raised in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II). 
There, the issue was whether district courts were empowered to require 
the government to provide thirty days' notice to both the court and 
counsel before transferring detainees from Guantanamo Bay. 33 After first 
holding that the district court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the 
petitioners' claims even though those claims related to what the 
government called "ancillary" habeas corpus rights, the court found that 
habeas corpus was not available to bar the transfer of the detainees based 
upon a likelihood that the detainees may be tortured in the recipient 
country.14 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Munaf v. Geren,35 the 
D.C. Circuit held that the "district court may not question the 
Government's determination that a potential recipient country is not 
likely to torture a detainee."36 
28. 555 F.3d 1022, 1023�24 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), modified on reh 'g, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 20 I 0) (noting that five of the petitioners had rejected offers of 
rese�lement
. 
and were .still being held at Guantanamo Bay, the court granted the government's mot10n to remstate the Judgment and reinstated their original opinion). 
29. Id at 1032 .  
30. Id at 1026-29. 
31. Id at I 025-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Id at 1026-29. 
33. 561F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010). 
34. Id at 512-14. 
35. 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008). 
36. Kiyemba fl, 561 F.3d at 514. 
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Given these decisions, the most critical issues with respect to the 
Guantanamo litigation remain open even after Bownediene. In 
particular, can a court order the release of an individual it has found, in 
essence, to be innocent or can it do no more than issue an advisory 
opinion that grants the writ and pleads with the government to effect a 
release? Further, when there is credible evidence that an individual could 
be subjected to torture or worse in a country to which the United States 
plans to send the individual, does a habeas court properly seized with 
jurisdiction have any means to prevent the transfer? 
B Extra-Guantanamo Litigation 
It remains to be seen whether Boumediene ultimately will be 
applied to U.S. detention centers outside of Guantanamo Bay. 
Boumediene, of course, was somewhat fact specific and relied in part on 
the unusual de facto sovereignty exercised by the U.S. in Guantanamo. 
Indeed, the Court cited this reality as one reason why the Guantanamo 
detainees were differently situated from those in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
in which the Court had held that habeas jurisdiction did not extend to 
nonresident enemy aliens detained in a German prison operated by the 
Allied Powers after World War II.37 
Nonetheless, one judge in the D.C. District Court found 
Boumediene to be controlling in the affirmative as to the question of 
whether certain individuals detained at the Bagram Air Force Base 
(operated by the United States in Afghanistan) were entitled to bring 
habeas petitions.38 Not surprisingly perhaps given its serial hostility to 
the claims of detainees, the D.C. Circuit reversed in Al Maqaleh v. Gates 
(Al Maqaleh II) .39 There the court purported to examine the factors 
outlined in Boumediene for determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause, and concluded that the "practical obstacles inherent in resolving 
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ" were decidedly in favor of the 
United States' position that the Suspension Clause should not be 
available in Bagram.40 In particular, the court noted the fact that the war 
was still ongoing in Afghanistan, and that the United States does not 
exercise the same type of sovereignty over Bagram Air Force Base as it 
does over Guantanamo Bay.41 
37. 339 U.S. 763, 780-81 (1950). 
38. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh l), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009), revli, 
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
39. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 FJd 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
40. Id at 95-97 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. Id at 97-98. 
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Any appeal of this decision would be heard by a Supreme Court 
that includes Elena Kagan. Justice Kagan was counsel for the 
government in Al Maqaleh JI as Solicitor General an� there�ore: would 
presumably recuse herself from hearing �he case now. Cons1
.
denng that 
there are four justices whose votes agamst the Bagram detamees are a 
certainty in all but the most metaphysical sense, there is no reason to 
believe that Al Maqaleh II will be disturbed any time soon. As such, 
there may be little in the way of extra-Guantanamo application of 
Boumediene during the foreseeable future. 
V. THE (NOT So) NEW WORLD OF DETENTION LAW 
The extensive chronology of Guantanamo detention litigation, 
broken into its component parts, disguises the significance of 
Boumediene relative to the Court's decisions that preceded it. The 
crucial distinction between Boumediene and its predecessors, at its 
essence, is two-fold: the legal basis of the Court's holding and an 
unmistakable subtext that the Court was no longer content with 
resolution by the nation's political branches. 
The decisions in Hamdan, HamdJ� and Rasul were premised on 
statutory, rather than constitutional interpretation. The statutory 
approach pitched the dispute over detention policy as a separation of 
powers tension between the President and Congress. The threshold 
question in Boumediene was constitutional and not statutory--either the 
Suspension Clause could be used to challenge the government's 
detention policy or it could not. In contrast to a statutory holding, a 
finding of constitutional infirmity renders a course of action per se 
unlawful, rather than simply politically difficult. As such, decisions like 
Hamdan had been characterized as "democracy-forcing" rather than 
categorical judicially invoked prohibitions.43 Thus, the Supreme Court's 
position as the arbiter of constitutional meaning transformed the 
fundamental separation of powers issue from one between the political 
branches into one pitting the ability (and willingness) of the judiciary to 
affirmatively invalidate political branch action on grounds that the 
political branches are incapable of resolving. This movement by the 
Court inexorably changed the nature of the separation of powers issues 
from one between the political branches into a necessary (if somewhat 
42. Michael Doyle, Court: Bagram Prisoners Don't Have Guantanamo Habeas Rights, 
McCLATCHY, May 21, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/21/94620/court-bagram­
prisoners-dont-have-html. 
43. Jack M. Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, BALKINIZATION (June 29, 
2006, 1 :07 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision. html. 
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reluctant) commentary regarding the judicial position in detenninations 
potentially impacting national security. 
The Court's repeated appointment with detention policy and 
frequent insistence on statutory interpretation betrays the tension 
between a long-standing position of deference in national security 
questions and an obvious discomfort with national security policies that 
unmistakably rolled back protections many legal scholars considered 
implicit in the rights-based revolution within constitutional doctrine over 
the past several decades. The Boumediene decision attempts to bridge 
this divide with ambitious action coupled with language of restraint. 
Interpreting this disconnect has, to date, largely been left to the lower 
courts. That stasis will have to change. 
A. Boumediene s Ambitiousness and Restraint 
Historically, the Supreme Court has deferred to the political 
branches on questions involving foreign relations generally and national 
security specifically. Within this deferential posture, the positions of the 
executive branch have been granted exceptional weight. The Supreme 
Court's deference in World War II era cases like Johnson v. Eisentrager44 
and Ex Parte Qwiin45 fonned the foundation of the Bush Administration's 
legal position as the litigation over detention began to unfold in the early 
2000s. In fact, it is ahnost impossible to imagine Guantanamo without 
the broad, deferential decisions by the judiciary of that earlier era. 
Conventional academic wisdom has posited that the judiciary's 
deferential posture was animated by the import of such questions to the 
nation's survival and the institutional advantages enjoyed by the political 
branches, especially the President, in questions of foreign relations. This 
exercise of judicial deference has frequently been characterized as a 
demonstration of judicial modesty. 
The normative desirability and impetus behind such deference has 
been debated by academics for several yearS.46 W hatever the wisdom or 
motivating animus, Boumediene represents a judicial willingness to 
44. 339 U.S. 763, 789-91 (1950). 
45 . See 317 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1942). 
46. This exercise of judicial deference has frequently been characterized as demonstration 
of judicial modesty. This claim has been persuasively questioned by Professor Jack Goldsmith, 
who has characterized judicial decision making in foreign affairs matters as an exercise of a 
"foreign relations effects test." Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Fonnalism in Umted States Foreign 
Relations Law, 70 U. COL. L. REv. 1395, 1395-97 (1999). Under Goldsmith's analysis judges 
defer when they view the effects on foreign relations as substantial, but eschew deference when 
they ?e�ieve such effects to be marginal. If true, such independent determinations by the judiciary 
are difficult to categorize as acts of judicial "modesty." Id at 1410-24. 
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carve a solid foothold into questions invoking foreign affairs and t�atio�al 
security. For the first time, the Supreme Court r
.
eversed presidential 
actions that the executive branch had energetically defended as 
fundamental to its prosecution of national security policy, while that 
challenged policy remained in force. This is likely to give p a�se to t?e 
next administration that contemplates gross unilateral expansion of its 
own power. 
. . . , While the Court's repudiation of the Bush Admtrustrat10n s 
detention policy marked a robust stake for the judiciary in national 
security policy, its stated path to that outcome suggests a distinct fear of 
institutional overreach in three easily discernible ways-the absence of 
hallmarks, an excessive reliance on procedural over substantive law, and 
the inherent tension between its rhetoric and its result regarding 
deference. 
Given the practical import of its decision, the Court's opinion 
provides precious little guidance for lower court implementation. Teed 
u p  for consideration, but either left inexplicably vague or unexpressed 
altogether, were fundamental issues running the spectrum of detention, 
including the threshold question of Suspension Clause applicability and 
the question of whether the judiciar y possesses the power to order a 
detainee's release contrary to an executive branch demand. 
On one level, a minimalist intervention in the consequentialist 
oriented policy realm of national security is understandable and laudable. 
Over the past few decades the Court has consistently embraced a limited 
exercise of its power to nullify law in favor of a variety of interpretive 
canons intended to force increased legislative clarity and in recognition 
of democratic prerogatives of law.47 These judicial predispositions, 
coupled with the entrenched doctrine of deferring to political branch 
directives in foreign affairs and national security not only make the 
Court's opinion understandable but also perhaps prudent. Unfortunately, 
the fundamental rationale for such judicial minimalism is largely 
inapplicable in determining appropriate detention law and lawful 
detention policy. 
Remand to the lower courts to enable the slow marination endemic 
to the common law system is typical and appropriate when underlying 
policy choices do not cause significant harm to the parties at interest. 
The creation of a clearly lawful and fair detention policy in c ombating 
. 
4 7 · Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has 
FaJled and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 779, 786 n.18 (2009) (citing 
�I �lewellyn for the long-s�ding assertion that canons of interpretation often point in varying 
d1Tect10ns, thus often undermmmg congressional purposes). 
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terrorism does not represent the type of legal exercise in which the slow 
machinations of judicial experimentation are wise, however. In these 
circumstances, the Court's reticence hinders the development of, and 
pragmatic reliance upon, a doctrine of how and when the lower courts 
should exercise the judiciary's power in matters of foreign affairs and has, 
by all appearances, failed to enable the current presidential 
administration from plotting a safe policy course for future detentions. 
B. Standards of Uncertainty 
As noted above, the detention policy at Guantanamo Bay has been 
in effect for years and had been the subject of multiple Supreme Court 
cases that have yet to provide certainty. There can be little doubt that 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boumediene betrayed a judicial frustration 
that the political branches had not incorporated the Court's decisions in 
Rasul and Hamdan in a manner that steered more decisively toward 
protecting individual rights. Specifically, the Court's repudiation of the 
government's argument that the detentions at Guantanamo were 
completely ungoverned by the Constitution as a threshold matter was 
manifestly doomed by the Court's dicta in Rllsul, which offered that the 
breadth of the statutory right to habeas corpus at question in that case 
would logically extend to the constitutional scope of the writ. 48 However, 
just as Boumediene represents a case made necessary by previous 
decisions' limited holdings, Boumediene was bound to perpetuate 
uncertainty, given the amorphous standards it created and its judicial 
silence on certain points. 
1. When Does the Suspension Clause Attach? 
In the end, Bownediene answered the system's most exigent 
constitutional question, but created new universes of ambiguity in two 
ways. First, it failed to provide a standard of Suspension Clause 
applicability in a manner that could be readily applied to other emerging 
detention regimes. Second, it ignored the constellation of issues that 
inevitably flowed from definitively granting habeas rights to detained 
parties at Guantanamo. 
Boumediene failed to reach either of two obvious conclusions that 
would have created clear rules for future decisions-that individuals held 
extraterritorially by the U.S. government possess habeas rights under the 
Suspension Clause or they do not. In so doing, the Court necessarily 
48. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008). 
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moved into the unstable realm of the "balancing test." Unfortunately, the 
balancing test embraced by the Court relies upon factors that themselves 
are ambiguously determined or questionable in their relevance. Under 
Boumediene three elements are to be considered in balancing whether 
the Suspension Clause is applicable: (1) the detainee's citizenship and 
status, and the appropriateness of the process by which that status 
attached; (2) the situs of capture and, subsequently, detention; and (3) the 
practical considerations inherent to determining a detainee 's entitlement 
to the writ.49 
These factors are individually and collectively ambiguous. 
Individually, each relies upon subjective judgments in which reasonable 
minds could disagree despite being presented with identical facts. The 
appropriateness of the process may invoke a sustained individualized 
analysis of procedural safeguards offered, but is sharply limited by 
endless variations of status determinations and their consequences. 
Presumably the Suspension Clause more likely applies when the site of 
capture is not a battlefield. This may be sensible if the battlefield in 
question is conventional in nature, as at that point the other instruments 
of law, such as the Geneva Conventions, are more likely to apply.so 
However, Guantanamo gained its fame precisely because individuals at 
or near areas of low-level conflict, the contemporary "battlefield," were 
not granted access to legal regimes such as the Conventions.s• Moreover, 
the situs of detention not only possesses substantial ambiguity, but 
questionable relevance. Under international law, national forces that 
capture individuals they believe to be dangerous are required to remove 
those detainees away from the zones of danger.s2 It is unclear on its face 
why detention of an individual in a safe zone in Afghanistan would 
militate against applying the Suspension Clause, while the detention of 
the same individual at a U.S. military base in Germany, for example, 
would not. Finally, the Court's reference to practical considerations tells 
us nothing as to what specific considerations are relevant, what weight to 
give different such considerations, or whether any deference should be 
afforded to the government's assertions as to such considerations. 
In a collective sense, the Boumediene test offers no guidance as to 
how the three factors should be weighed for final determination. The 
49. Id at 766. 
50. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
S 1. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, ls the President Bo1U1d by the Geneva Conventions?, 
90 CORNELLL. REV. 97, 108-20 (2004). 
52. Geneva Convention III, supmnote 50, art. 19. 
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absence of such guidance exacerbates the uncertainty of the individual 
factors by creating a macro subjective judgment that, presumably, is 
enabled by micro subjective judgments. This was ably d emonstrated in 
Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit's decision examining whether the 
Boumediene Suspension Clause standard would entitle those held at the 
Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan to habeas rights.53 In Al Maqaleh, 
the Court held that the citizenship/status, situs of capture, and other 
detention factors outlined in Boumediene weighed in favor of 
Suspension Clause application. 54 Despite this, the Court held that the 
practical considerations prong of the test weighed prohibitively in favor 
of precluding the application of the Suspension Clause.55 The fact that 
the Court's position on this matter was not obvious on its face is 
demonstrated by the fact that in the same case the U.S. District Court had 
reached the opposite conclusion with apparently equal confidence.56 
2. What Is the Judiciary's Power in Ordering Release? 
The protections embedded in habeas proceedings are entirely 
dependent upon the judicial power to order the release of someone 
unlawfully detained by the government. At the time Boumediene was 
argued and decided, the government appeared unwilling to argue, and the 
Court unlikely to decide, that a grant of habeas to detainees might not 
encompass the power of the judiciary to order release. As a result, it is 
ironic that a decision issued by the Supreme Court on the same day as 
Boumediene has posed the greatest obstacle to judicially ordered release 
of detainees found unlawfully held. The Court in Munaf held that a U.S. 
court sitting in habeas could not prevent the transfer of t wo Americans 
being held legally by the U.S. military in Iraq to Iraqi authorities.51 This 
holding was interpreted by the D.C. Circuit to mean that the judiciary 
was not empowered to "second-guess" government determinations of the 
transfer (or release) of detainees from Guantanamo. 
C. The Future ofBoumediene-Resolving Power and Deference 
The Bownediene majority decision based its holding on a structural 
view of separation of powers without relying on a structural 
determination of Suspension Clause rights. As such, resolving the 
53. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 93-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
54. Id at 94-97. 
55. Id at 99. 
56. Id at 97. 
57. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008). 
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tension between Boumediene's deferential rhetoric and its nondefcrential 
ruling is, at its core, not about allowing judicial experimentation, but 
rather about more clearly defining judicial power in an area where such 
power has historically been comparatively weak .  . 
The overarching theme of Boumediene is not found in questions of 
citizenship, status, situs, and asserted practicalities. None of those 
factors meaningfully resulted in the Court stepping away from deference 
doctrines and toward a more muscular view of judicial power in areas of 
national security. As a precedent, the crucial holding in Bomnediene 
derived from the Court's willingness to exercise judicial power to rein in 
political branch national security actions as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine. While not utilizing the clear structural rules available in 
interpreting the Suspension Clause, the Court embraced a larger 
structural Constitution that "ensures that, except during periods of formal 
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to 
maintain the delicate balance of governance that is itself the surest 
safeguard of liberty."58 Under this reading, deference to the political 
branches as to release or applicability of the writ becomes fundamentally 
contrary to the responsibility held by the judicial branch as an 
independent branch of government. 
In order for Boumediene to take its proper place as one of the 
substantial Court decisions of this era, it is necessary for judges and 
policy makers to understand its fundamental holding as more than the 
sum of its parts. To date, the Obama Administration has failed to heed 
this lesson, scrutinizing facts rather than the larger dimensions of the 
exercise of government power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Boumediene the Court takes a significant step away from 
deferring its role in areas of national security. The Court left 
implementation of its decision to the lower courts. To date, policy 
makers have allowed the lower courts to resolve the logistical ambiguities 
in Boumediends murky standards and silences. Instead, both 
policymakers and lower court judges should take up the task of looking 
beyond ambiguities in order to understand the decision in a manner 
consistent with the decision's unmistakably forward-looking view m 
order to create legal and policy certainty for the future. 
58. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
